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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether institutional governance and its performance is a main driving force to 
achieve a positive relationship between natural resources and economic growth in the long run. The main objective 
is to ascertain what kind of institutional governance would be needed to distribute natural resource wealth in such a 
way so as to achieve economic stability, and what specific policies are needed to avoid the curse in resource-rich 
developing countries. The research makes an attempt to interpret the role of institutional governance, as reflected by 
the indicators, in the context of resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. The main finding is that an abundance of 
natural resources does not guarantee economic growth, where sustainable economic growth can be guaranteed, only 
if the resource-rich country has good institutional governance. 
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I. Introduction 
Theoretically, an abundance of natural resources tends to stimulate economic growth and to 
move the economy to a steady state. In contrast, though, there are many empirical surveys which 
show and emphasize a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth (e.g., Sachs & Warner, 1995). These empirical studies show that resource-scarce 
economies tend to exhibit higher economic performance than resource-rich economies in the 
long run. Thus, managing natural-resource income is a more important issue for resource-rich 
countries so as to avoid the impact of the so-called natural resource curse (Eifert, Gelb, & Borje, 
2002). These considerations include how much natural resource wealth to leave to the next 
generation, how to attain stability with uncertain and widely fluctuating natural-resource incomes 
such as for oil, and how to determine an efficient strategy for spending natural-resource income. 
 For Ilmi (2007), natural resource management issues are connected both directly and 
indirectly to governance indicators which seem to play a crucial role in the natural resource curse 
in resource-rich developing countries. In spite of their natural resource abundance, Nigeria, 
Venezuela, Angola, and Ecuador, for example, have shown low economic performance over the 
last decades. However, countries in South East Asia have achieved supercharged economic 
growth without having any kind of natural resources. Ilmi (2007) argues that some reasons for 
failed economic growth may be attributed to Dutch disease, insufficient diversification, rent 
seeking and conflict, overconfidence and loose economic policies, and debt overhang.  Thus, for 
management success, the performance of economic development, a sufficient economic policy, 
and strong fiscal discipline are, according to Ilmi, the most important for natural resource 
management in a resource-rich state. 
 The purpose of this paper is to test whether institutional governance and its performance 
is a main driving force to achieve a positive relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth in the long run. The main objective is to ascertain what kind of institutional governance 
would be needed to distribute natural resource wealth in such a way so as to achieve economic 
stability, and what specific policies are needed to avoid the curse in resource-rich, developing 
countries. The study here makes an attempt to interpret the role of governance, as reflected by 
the indicators, in the context of resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. As the historical, social, and 
institutional context is relatively homogeneous among post-Soviet countries, and as they 
continue to engage in cross-border transactions, they constitute a more useful set of countries to 
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compare than, for example, countries that do not share such features, such as Nigeria and 
Norway.    
The impact of four governance indicators - the multi-optional export system, fiscal 
discipline, sufficient institutions, and external debt - on long-run economic development will be 
tested using natural-resource income. Doing so should help determine whether these four 
indicators are the essential attributes needed by government to create sustained economic growth 
in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries.   
 Having regained their independence at the beginning of the 1990s, resource-rich, post-
Soviet countries are still young and blessed with a large reserve of oil and natural gas resources.  
However, it is questionable whether these countries should be considered successful in 
translating their oil income into the sustainable development of the country. There is a lack of 
empirical research addressing the relationship between natural resource richness and economic 
growth in the case of resource-rich, post-Soviet states, and this proposed study would, it is 
hoped, go some way towards filling this gap.  
 
II. Developments in Natural Resources and Governance in Post-Soviet Countries  
 
a. Natural Resources 
The importance of natural resource abundance for long-run economic growth and how to 
explain the impact of four governance indicators on the economic growth of resource-rich, post-
Soviet countries is the main purpose of this study. One pioneering study highlighting the 
importance of the negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth in the long run is Sachs and Warner (1995). The authors show that resource-rich, 
developing countries are likely to grow slower and gain insignificant economic development 
than resource-poor ones. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) revisit this negative relationship by 
questioning the transforming of natural resources to long-run economic development through 
which the kind of natural resources would hinder economic growth in resource-rich developing 
countries. Authors found that trade openness and educational investment have a direct and 
positive effect on natural-resource income and economic growth, and their transmission 
channels. Leite and Weidmann (1999) also analyze the existence of the “resource curse” 
hypothesis where the authors highlight that natural resource based industries hamper economic 
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development through corruption and conflict in resource-rich developing countries. Therefore, 
the impact of natural resource abundance on sustainable economic growth plays important and 
various roles in explaining the economic development of resource-rich developing countries. 
It might be shown that resource-rich countries grow slower than resource-scarce 
countries, but not all of them. For instance, Ilmi (2007) points out that Botswana, a Central 
African country with no access to the sea (natural resources are usually exported by sea), had 
experienced sufficient economic development in the last decades. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001) emphasize that Botswana’s good governance institutions were motivation for 
its remarkable long-run economic development. Another example is studied by Rahim and 
Liwan (2012), where it is empirically shown that Malaysia seems to have succeeded in 
establishing sustainable economic development by managing its natural resource through good 
governance indicators. 
It seems that the negative effect of natural resources on economic development cannot be 
generalized for all developing countries. Thus, in the case of resource-rich, post-Soviet countries, 
it is questionable whether they have lower economic growth than resource-poor ones. It is also 
questionable whether these resource-rich countries could gain sustainable development without 
natural resource abundances. Thus, the possible explanations for these issues make this study 
interesting in that it would explore the transmission channel of natural-resource incomes into 
economic growth in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries.  
First, the existence of a multi-optional export system is important in explaining the 
transformation of natural-resource income into significant economic growth in resource-rich, 
post-Soviet countries. In these countries, sectors other than natural resources (typically 
manufacturing) are likely to suffer from a real appreciation of the national currency (Corden & 
Neary, 1982). The percentages of fuel, ores, and metal exports on total merchandise export are 
very high in resource-exporting, post-Soviet countries (Appendix A, Figure A1). The incomes 
from natural resources exporting are likely absorbed by the domestic nontradables sector, where 
it is an obstacle to long-run, sustainable economic development in resource-rich, post-Soviet 
countries. 
Second, natural resource abundance may also infuse government with overconfidence in 
their macroeconomic and fiscal policy decisions (Ilmi, 2007). Devarajan and Swarrop (1998) 
emphasize that natural-resource income may cause reduced pressure on tax collection, where it 
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may cause lower fiscal discipline. Oil-producing, post-Soviet countries are likely to charge lower 
domestic gasoline prices, implying that natural resource rents obtained from upstream royalties 
are subsidizing domestic downstream consumption. Reduced gasoline prices for citizens and 
compensation for this deficit with a subsidy from natural-resource income tends to weaker fiscal 
discipline (Kronenberg, 2004). 
Third, one of the important issues for resource-rich developing countries is debt 
overhang, where natural-resource income tends to depend on exogenous foreign shocks, which 
negatively affect stable economic growth and create difficulties for debt management (de 
Ferranti, Lederman, Maloney, & Guillermo, 2001). However, resource-rich, post-Soviet 
countries have less external debt when compared to resource-scarce ones (Appendix A, Figure 
A2). So, it seems that debt overhang does not play an important role in explaining the negative 
impact of natural-resource income on economic growth in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. 
Finally, it is still debatable whether resource-rich, post-Soviet countries have failed to 
transform their natural-resource income into sustainable economic development.  These three 
possible reasons do not give a clear explanation of whether the “resource curse” exists in these 
countries. Therefore, in doing empirical study, a clearer explanation on the negative relationship 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth in these countries could be 
demonstarted. 
 
b. Governance 
It is also major importance for natural resource management whether institutions are the 
main reason for natural-resource incomes to transform into sustainable economic development in 
resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. Ilmi (2007) argues that good institutions mean a sufficient 
economic policy and strong fiscal discipline, where it is a main factor for an effectiveness and 
efficiency in natural resource management and in the performance of economic development in 
resource–rich developing countries. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that good 
institutions are the key factor of growth in the long-run. If governance is poor, natural resources 
can be wasted quickly in less developed countries. It seems that sufficient institutional 
governance could change the negative effect of natural resource abundance on transforming 
these incomes into long-run economic development. This paper attempt to show whether 
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sufficient institutions are the main driving force to alter the negative relationship between natural 
richness and economic development in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. 
The properties of sufficient institutions developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2003) cover six dimensions of governance as “voice and accountability”, “political stability”, 
“government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, “rule of law”, and “control of corruption”. 
These indicators play an important role in seeing how good governance indicators can influence 
the transformation of natural-resource income into sustainable economic development in 
resource-rich countries. In general, post-Soviet countries have a lower transparent political 
process, more restrictions on civil liberties, lower public service quality, and higher corruption 
when comparing the average institutional indicators to the rest of the world. It is also easy to see 
that the average institutional indicators are lower in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries than in 
the resource-poor ones (see Appendix B, Figure B1-B6).  Therefore, these countries do not seem 
to have succeeded in establishing sufficient institutions nor good governance, where it might be 
main reason for the negative relationship between natural resources and economic development. 
Finally, although initial conditions were similar across post-Soviet countries, their 
economic growth performance has diverged in the last two decades. It might be true that these 
differences on economic development could be explained by natural resource richness and good 
governance indicators, because natural resource abundance and governance indicators are the 
main differences between these countries. This paper analyzes the relationship between natural 
resource richness and economic growth using institutional governance indicators in resource-
rich, post-Soviet countries. 
 
III. Research Methodology 
 
a. Regression Model 
This paper examines the impact of governance performance on economic development in 
resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. The study reassesses the impact of natural resources on 
economic growth using panel data. Using the panel data approach for post-Soviet countries in the 
range 1996-2010, allows us to see the importance of sufficient institutions to explain the 
relationship between natural resources and economic growth. An analysis would show us which 
institutions have a significant positive impact on economic growth with the condition of having 
7 
 
an abundance of natural resources. The main expectation is better institutions can avoid the 
negative impact of natural resources on long-run economic growth in resource-rich, post-Soviet 
countries.  
The methodology for analyzing the relationship between natural resources and economic 
growth is by following the standard economic literature (e.g. Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 
2003; Ilmi, 2007).  The empirical growth model used in this study is: 
                          
 
                                    
               
 
  
                               
where i refers to countries, t to time. The        is the manufacturing growth, which is 
estimated as an annual growth rate of manufacturing value added. It is estimated as a real non-oil 
GDP growth. The     represents a proxy variable for a natural resource, which is estimated as a 
net fuel, ores, and metal exports of countries; θ shows 6 different institutional indicators, which 
are estimated in the same way used by Kaufmann, et al. (2003), n is population growth, τ is the 
average tax rate,    represents the percentage of external debt on GNI, and X includes 
exogenous variables for the empirical growth model. The interaction term allows us to address 
how natural resource abundance and good institutional governance influence manufacturing 
growth together. 
 
b.  Econometrics Issue 
The empirical research estimates a panel data model, where this study would utilize a 
panel data of 11 post-Soviet countries over the period 1996-2010. Several limitations exist: 
reverse causality (a bidirectional effect between economic growth and institutions); the problem 
of an omitted variable bias (a country-specific, unobservable effect); and a measurement of 
manufacturing which is likely to exhibit measurement errors. 
In this analysis, economic growth is affected by natural resource exports and institutional 
governance; at the same time, natural resource exports and institutions are likely to be influenced 
by the particular stage of economic development. Consequently, the explanatory variables may 
be correlated with an error term. To solve this problem, the analysis uses lags of     as an 
instrument of the variable in order to avoid endogeneity problems. To deal with unobservable 
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heterogeneity, the panel data estimation requires several assumptions. Denoting growth equation 
(1) in panel formulation with the constant term    : 
                          
 
                                    
               
 
  
                               
And in the case of the pooled OLS, and the random effects (RE) model with time and country 
effects, where               (   is country-specific effect,    the time effect, and     a 
white noise) is:  
                           
 
                                    
               
 
  
                           
where for the fixed effects (FE) model with time and country effects,             .  The 
pooled OLS model assumes that the effect of explanatory variables and intercepts are the same 
for all countries. The RE model analyzes the error variance structure                
affected by the country/time specific effect, while the FE model asks how the country/time 
specific effect affects the intercept (Park, 2005).  
Therefore, the empirical research uses 3 different types of estimation method, where the 
main hypothesis is that a negative association between mineral natural-resource income and 
manufacturing growth exists in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries, and good institutional 
governance can alter these negative effects. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
In this section, the most relevant results concerning panel data analysis in the case of 
resource-rich, post-Soviet countries are discussed. Six different instrumental variable regressions 
are performed with data that analyze the association between natural resource richness and 
economic growth in post-Soviet countries. These instrumental variables are not easy to define 
and measure, where this paper used institutional governance indicators by Kaufmann, et al. 
(2003). Each institutional governance index is normalized between zero and one hundred, where 
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one hundred represents sufficient and zero represents insufficient institutions. The appendix 
describes the sample tables for most relevant results. 
The regressions are estimated with and without institutional variables, where the first 
regression represents results without the institutional variable, and the other six regressions are 
estimated by six different institutional governance indicators. The dependent variable is taken as 
a manufacturing value added (% of GDP), and various relevant macro variables are instrumented 
by their lagged values (see Appendix A, Figure A3&A4).  
An empirical analysis is based on a pooled OLS model that assumes all post-Soviet 
countries would react in the same way to changes in economic growth, and that intercepts are the 
same for all post-Soviet countries. The results are statistically significant and support the 
resource curse hypothesis in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries (see Appendix B, Table B1). If 
we cannot assume that the reaction to change in economic growth is the same for all post-Soviet 
countries, then it is adequate to estimate with either FE or RE models. The results analyzed with 
the F-test, where it determines the choice between the pooled OLS model and the FE model, and 
the LM-test allows us to choose between the pooled OLS model and the RE model. In the end, 
the Hausman test determines the choice of either the FE model or the RE model, where it allows 
us to know whether the RE model is efficient or not. Test statistics show that the FE model 
estimation method is adequate in several models (see Appendix B, Table B2).  
There are several different findings in the empirical results: 
In analyzing whether natural resource richness has a negative effect on sustainable 
economic development, this paper estimated the regression models with and without the 
interaction term to confirm whether the natural resource curse exists in resource-rich, post-Soviet 
countries. The coefficients of natural resources tend to be a negative when we add the interaction 
term of natural resource richness. These coefficients are statistically significant for all models 
with 3 different estimation methods. These findings support the natural resource curse hypothesis 
found in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. Therefore, resource-poor, post-Soviet countries are 
likely to grow faster than resource-rich ones. 
In analyzing whether sufficient institutions alter the relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth, the paper employs six different institutional indicators. The 
effects of institutional governance are not statistically significant in several models. It means that 
changes in economic growth cannot be explained with institutional governance over a very short 
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horizon of a few years in the case of post-Soviet countries. Although institutional indicators are 
not significant, the interaction terms of resource abundance and institutional governance have 
significant positive effect on economic growth, meaning that if the country has good governance, 
natural resource abundance is conducive to economic growth in resource-rich, post-Soviet 
countries. Because the results are statistically robust, it can be concluded that natural resource 
richness does not guarantee sustainable economic development, but with sufficient governance 
management, long-term economic development can be generated from natural resource richness 
in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. 
As for other explanatory variables, the coefficients of trade openness are significant, and 
they support that trade liberalization has a positive and strong effect on economic growth. 
Average tax has a positive impact on economic growth; it supports argument promoting strong 
fiscal discipline. The relationship between external debt and economic growth is negative, where 
it shows that external debt is an obstacle to economic growth in the case of resource-rich 
countries. 
The empirical results support the existence of the natural resource curse in resource-rich, 
post-Soviet countries. On the one hand, natural resources have a negative effect on economic 
growth; on the other hand, the interaction term has a positive effect on economic growth. 
Therefore, good governance can avoid the negative effect of natural resources on economic 
growth. 
Robustness 
It is possible that institutional indicators could be endogenous, where economic growth 
has a causal effect on institutions. Note that if institutions are endogenous, then the interaction 
term between mineral export and institutions are also endogenous. To check the endogeneity of 
natural resources, this research used the Hausman test, and the results still support the existence 
of the natural resource curse in resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. 
This research used a robust variance matrix estimator and robust test statistics to deal 
with serial correlation in the pooled OLS model. However, it is possible that unobservable 
effects might affect economic growth in the case of post-Soviet countries. To deal with 
unobservable heterogeneity, the study estimated the relationship between natural resource 
richness and economic growth with FE and RE models, where the statistical test shows that the 
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results are statistically significant, and the FE model is an appropriate estimation method for the 
panel data model in the case of resource-rich, post-Soviet countries.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has examined the accepted notion of a natural resource curse, where, for 
example, resource-rich, post-Soviet countries grow more slowly than resource-scarce ones. The 
main finding is institutional governance and its performance is a main driving force to alter a 
negative relationship between natural resources and economic growth in these countries. 
As for transforming natural-resource income into sustainable economic development, the 
abundance of natural resources does not guarantee economic growth. Sustainable economic 
development can be guaranteed, only if the resource-rich country has good institutional 
governance. Good institutional governance - specifically, a strong public voice with 
accountability, strong political stability, good regulations, and powerful anticorruption policies 
tends to conduce a positive relationship between natural resource richness and economic 
development. Consequently, resource-rich, post-Soviet countries can take advantage of their 
natural resource abundance, establish good governance such as strong fiscal discipline and 
sufficient institutions to transform natural-resource incomes into consistent and sustained 
economic development. 
It is important to introduce explicit fiscal rules for the treatment of mineral revenues in 
resource-rich, post-Soviet countries. One policy implication might be to increase transparency in 
natural resource management with external international audits, where it would increase 
efficiency in transforming natural-resource income into sustainable economic development. 
Second, one might consider an industrial policy that targets especially the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. Because of slower manufacturing growth in resource-rich, post-Soviet 
countries when compared to resource-poor ones, resource-rich countries might concentrate on 
the manufacturing industry, where this industry could strongly guarantee sustainable economic 
development. 
This study has several weaknesses, where the panel data used data from only 11 post-
Soviet countries.  The sample was from 1996 to 2010, which is not enough to explain 
transforming natural-resource income into sustainable economic development in the long run. It 
might be exists that the impact of natural resources is meaningful to economic growth only after 
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a certain threshold point of institutional quality or a certain threshold point of natural-resource 
incomes. Further research, however, can take into account the non-linear effect to explain the 
link between natural resource richness and economic development in the case of resource-rich, 
post-Soviet countries. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. List of Sample Countries 
  Country name Country code   Country name Country code 
1 Armenia ARM 9 Lithuania LTU 
2 Azerbaijan AZE 10 Moldova MOL 
3 Belarus BEL 11 Russian Federation RUS 
4 Estonia EST 12 Ukraine UKR 
5 Georgia GEO 13 Uzbekistan  UZB 
6 Kazakhstan KAZ 14 Tajikistan TJK 
7 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ 15 Turkmenistan TRK 
8 Latvia LVA       
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP growth 180.00 5.59 6.47 -17.95 34.50 
Manufacturing growth 158.00 5.05 10.97 -42.13 59.45 
Manufacturing value added 158.00 16.84 7.01 4.09 34.84 
External debt stocks 165.00 55.34 32.93 10.40 164.32 
Net taxes 180.00 21.11 1.71 18.29 26.23 
Population growth  180.00 -0.12 0.82 -2.58 2.64 
Initial GDP 180.00 1393.30 980.16 394.86 3339.86 
Governance Indicators   
Control of Corruption 180.00 32.85 21.49 4.88 80.98 
Rule of Law 180.00 35.35 21.75 5.21 86.06 
Regulatory Quality 180.00 47.34 24.60 3.92 91.87 
Government Effectiveness 180.00 40.89 21.00 10.24 85.17 
Political Stability  180.00 40.62 20.24 6.25 83.65 
Voice and Accountability 180.00 39.28 23.09 3.37 84.62 
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Source: World Development Indicator, WB Database, 2012 
Figure A1. Fuel Exports (% of Merchandise Exports, 2010)  
by Country 
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Figure A2. External Debt Stocks (% of GNI, 2010 and 1996)  
by Country 
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Figure A3. Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP),  
Resource-Poor, Post-Soviet Countries, 1996-2010 
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Figure A4. Manufacturing, Value Added (% of GDP),  
Resource-Rich, Post-Soviet Countries, 1996-2010 
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 Figure B1. Voice and Accountability (2010) by Country 
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Figure B2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (2010) by Country 
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Figure B3. Government Effectiveness (2010) by Country 
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Figure B4. Rule of Law (2010) by Country 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2012  
Figure B5. Regulatory Quality (2010) by Country  
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Figure B6. Control of Corruption (2010) by Country 
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Estimation Results with pooled OLS 
Regression 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
F test 10.71 8.02 12.78 14.82 10.06 10.47 19.66 
Mineral Export (MIN)  -0.069*** -0.135*** -0.108*** -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.171*** -0.180*** 
  (-0.023) (0.041) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.039) 
Control of Corruption  (CORR)  
 
-0.0387* 
    
  
  
 
(0.0184) 
    
  
MIN*CORR 
 
0.0018* 
    
  
  
 
(0.0009) 
    
  
Rule of Law  (LAW)  
  
-0.0030 
   
  
  
  
(0.0205) 
   
  
MIN*LAW 
  
0.0024* 
   
  
  
  
(0.0010) 
   
  
Regulatory Quality  (REG)  
   
0.0228 
  
  
  
   
(0.0177) 
  
  
MIN*REG 
   
0.0015* 
  
  
  
   
(0.0008) 
  
  
Government Effectiveness  (GOV)  
    
-0.0044 
 
  
  
    
(0.0196) 
 
  
MIN*GOV 
    
-0.0002 
 
  
  
    
(0.0009) 
 
  
Political Stability (POL)  
     
0.0433**   
  
     
(0.0173)   
MIN*POL 
     
0.0023***   
  
     
(0.0008)   
Voice and Accountability (VOI)  
      
0.0810*** 
  
      
(0.0148) 
MIN*VOI 
      
0.0033*** 
              (0.0007) 
Population growth -0.160*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.114*** -0.110** -0.147*** -0.146*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.041) (0.042) (0.047) (0.041) (0.043) 
External debt -0.097** -0.099** -0.072* -0.007 -0.046 -0.154*** -0.121*** 
  (0.054) (0.053) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.052) (0.042) 
Average tax rate 0.209*** 0.230*** 0.200*** 0.138*** 0.181*** 0.297*** 0.213*** 
  (0.057) (0.059) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.064) (0.049) 
Trade openness  0.151** 0.123* 0.138** 0.133*** 0.142** 0.145** 0.147** 
  (0.06) (0.072) (0.062) (0.055) (0.072) (0.068) (0.074) 
Initial GDP 0.022** 0.019** 0.021* 0.028** 0.019 -0.029 0.032** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.051) (0.015) 
Constant  1.929*** 2.896*** 2.430*** 1.194** 2.241** 3.298*** 5.085*** 
  (0.498) (0.693) (0.735) (0.890) (0.923) (0.690) (0.666) 
Number of observation 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Number of county 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
R
2
 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.48 
Adjusted  R
2
 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.38 0.46 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note:  
The Model (0) estimated without institutional variable, (1)-(6) estimated with 6 different institutional indicators. The dependent variable is 
manufacturing value added (% of GDP) and various relevant macro variables are instrumented by their lagged values.  
The White-heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 * , **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table C2. Estimation Results with FE/RE Models 
Regression 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Model
a
 FEM FEM FEM REM FEM REM FEM 
F test
b 
11.64 7.91 13.77 10.36 7.69 8.27 7.71 
LM
c 
40.85 41.47 54.14 52.48 45.92 48.37 43.45 
Hausman
d
  3.94 6.65 3.56 13.99 8.15 21.90 5.13 
Mineral Export (MIN)  -0.064** -0.070** -0.057** -0.022 -0.059* -0.103*** -0.053** 
  (0.033) (0.038) (0.028) (0.033) (0.042) (0.038) (0.014) 
Control of Corruption (CORR)  
 
-0.0021 
    
  
  
 
(0.035) 
    
  
MIN*CORR 
 
0.0012** 
    
  
  
 
(0.0007) 
    
  
Rule of Law  (LAW)  
  
-0.0339 
   
  
  
  
(0.0357) 
   
  
MIN*LAW 
  
0.0014** 
   
  
  
  
(0.0007) 
   
  
Regulatory Quality  (REG)  
   
-0.0013 
  
  
  
   
(0.0016) 
  
  
MIN*REG 
   
0.0262** 
  
  
  
   
(0.0123) 
  
  
Government Effectiveness  (GOV)  
    
0.0043 
 
  
  
    
(0.0147) 
 
  
MIN*GOV 
    
-0.0002 
 
  
  
    
(0.0007) 
 
  
Political Stability (POL)  
     
0.0198*   
  
     
(0.0124)   
MIN*POL 
     
0.0011*   
  
     
(0.0006)   
Voice and Accountability (VOI)  
      
0.0157* 
  
      
(0.0135) 
MIN*VOI 
      
0.0032*** 
  
      
(0.0006) 
Population growth 0.014 0.010 -0.142*** -0.114*** -0.075* -0.069** 0.081** 
  (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.063) (0.034) (0.033) 
External debt -0.070** -0.075** -0.048* -0.045* -0.068* -0.104* -0.069* 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.025) (0.027) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Average tax rate 0.022*** 0.024*** -0.004 0.025 0.040 0.077* 0.059* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
Trade openness  0.016** 0.143* 0.098** 0.124* 0.122** 0.136** 0.137** 
  (0.009) (0.112) (0.042) (0.095) (0.072) (0.079) (0.073) 
Initial GDP 
 
  
0.003** 
 
0.003**   
  
 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.001)   
Constant  5.158*** 5.297*** 4.192*** 3.307*** 4.631*** 5.538*** 4.919*** 
  (0.510) (0.706) (0.708) (0.798) (0.796) (0.764) (0.755) 
Number of observation 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Number of county 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
R
2
 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.36 0.35 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Notes: 
a
  The Model (0) estimated without institutional variable, (1)-(6) estimated with 6 different institutional indicators. The dependent 
variable is manufacturing value added (% of GDP) and various relevant macro variables are instrumented by their lagged values. 
b 
 The F test determines the choice between the pooled OLS Model and the FEM. 
c
  The LM test determines the choice between the pooled OLS Model and the REM. 
d 
 The Hausman test determines the choice between the FEM and the REM. Null hypothesis is RE is efficient. 
The White-heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* , **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
